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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Becklund appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance,
challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court erred in
denying Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress because the officer who detained him did not have
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the officer did not advise him of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), prior to subjecting him to a custodial interrogation.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Just before noon on November 4, 2019, Officer Johnson was on bicycle patrol near the
Interfaith Sanctuary and Corpus Christi house in downtown Boise, Idaho.1 (R., p.61.) Officer
Johnson saw what he believed to be suspicious activity between two people, Mr. Becklund and
Jeramiah Martinez. (R., p.61.) He testified he knew Mr. Martinez, as he had been told by
“several people . . . to keep an eye on him specifically because he was buying and selling drugs
in the area.” (Tr., p.28 (p.69, Ls.5-15.) Officer Johnson described the suspicious nature of the
activity he observed as follows:
I saw two individuals, two males standing in close proximately which in and of
itself—I guess they are standing in close proximity with their hands raised, and
they were closer than what I would describe as conversational distance and kinda
tighter body language. Overall I would say it was just more furtive movement.
And in totality, I thought it was just—it looked like a hand-to-hand drug deal . . . .
(Tr., p.15 (p.19, L.20 – p.20, L.4.)) He explained further, “they appeared to have hands up, closer
together, just a little bit tighter body language, a little bit more guarded, standing very close
together.” (Tr., p.16 (p.21, Ls.8-12.)) He did not further describe the “furtive movement.” (See

1

Officer Johnson testified that both of these facilities serve the homeless population, one as a
shelter, and the other as a day facility. (Tr., p.21 (p.43, L.23 – p.44, L.5.))
1

id.) Officer Johnson testified he observed what looked like a sunglasses case in Mr. Becklund’s
hand. 2 (R., p.62; Tr., p.16 (p.21, Ls.13-17.))
Officer Johnson rode his bicycle towards the two men, and they walked away. (R., p.63.)
Officer Johnson followed Mr. Becklund and “confronted him about what [he] saw.”3 (Tr., p.17
(p.26, Ls.4-8.)) After being confronted by Officer Johnson, Mr. Becklund emptied out a black
pouch he was carrying, which contained a number of needles. (Tr., p.17 (p.27, Ls.8-13.)) Officer
Johnson testified he “detained him at that point.” (Tr., p.17 (p.27, Ls.22-24.) He testified
Mr. Becklund was not free to leave. (Tr., p.20 (p.37, L.19 – p.38, L.3.))
After Mr. Becklund emptied the pouch, Officer Johnson twice asked him to sit down.
(Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 at 00:30-36.) Mr. Becklund sat down, and the officer twice asked him to “set
the case out in front of you.” (Id. at 00:44-47.) Officer Johnson asked him, “How much do you
got in there?” (Id. at 00:54-55.) Mr. Becklund answered, “There’s nothing in there.” (Id. at 1:0001.) Mr. Becklund said he finds syringes in the port-a-potties and does not want kids to touch
them. (Id. at 1:04-10.) The officer told Mr. Becklund he did not believe he found the syringes in
the port-a-potties. (Id. at 1:12-15.) The officer said, “You were over there just giving him
something.” (Id. at 1:19-22.) At this point, another police officer on a bicycle can be seen close
by, though the officer did not become involved at this point. (Id. at 1:25-35.)
Officer Johnson continued to question Mr. Becklund about what he was doing, and asked
him to “be straight up with me.” (Id. at 1:29-34.) The officer asked Mr. Becklund what he would
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Officer Johnson’s on-body video recording reflects that Mr. Becklund was carrying a number
of items, not just a sunglasses case. (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, at 00:12-30.) Mr. Becklund was
carrying a large blue bag, a small black pouch, a clear glasses-size case, a silver bottle with a
blue lid, and a red pen. (See Id.)
3
The events occurring after this point are reflected in Officer Johnson’s on-body video
recording, which was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. (See Tr., p.19 (p.35,
Ls.4-24); Plaintiff’s Ex. 1.)
2

find when he tested the syringes, and Mr. Becklund answered, “I’m guessing probably meth.”
(Id. at 1:38-45.) The officer said, “So you’re in possession of methamphetamine.” (Id. at 1:4548.) He again asked, referring to the glasses case, “How much you got in here?” (Id. at 1:48-52.)
Mr. Becklund replied, “There’s nothing in there.” (Id. at 1:53-53.) The officer asked, “Do you
want me to look?” (Id. at 1:54-55.) He asked, “How much meth have you got in here?” (Id. at
1:58-59.) He asked, “Am I okay to look?” and Mr. Becklund responded, “Go for it.” (Id. at 2:0306.) Officer Johnson searched the glasses case. (Id. at 2:07-3:00.) He later told Mr. Becklund that
he found a methamphetamine pipe and “some methamphetamine cleaning tools” in the case,
though he did not say anything about those items at the time of the search. (Id. at 5:12-35.)
After searching the case, Officer Johnson asked Mr. Becklund for identification. (Id. at
2:30-33.) Mr. Becklund provided the officer with identification. (Id. at 3:00-04.) Officer Johnson
next asked Mr. Becklund about a knife he saw in his pocket, which Mr. Becklund described as “a
little pocket knife.” (Id. at 3:06-12.) The officer asked him to set it down next to him and “don’t
get up.” (Id. at 3:12-16.) Mr. Becklund asked if he could have a cigarette and the officer
answered, “No cigarette just yet.” (Id. at 3:15-24.) The officer again asked Mr. Becklund, “Do
you have any more methamphetamine on you?” (Id. at 3:30-32.) Mr. Becklund answered, “No,”
and the officer asked him, “Are you certain of that?” (Id. at 3:33-37.) Mr. Becklund explained
that he did not, unless someone stuck it in his pocket while he was asleep, which could have
happened. (Id. at 3:38-46.)
The video reflects that, at this point, Mr. Becklund is seated on the ground with his back
up against a fence; two police officers, with their bikes nearby, are standing above him. (See id.
at 3:58-4:03.) Officer Johnson asked Mr. Becklund to stand up, and take his “big red jacket off.”
(Id. at 4:09-24.) Mr. Becklund complied, and the officer asked him to put his hands behind his
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back, and handcuffed him, continuing to question him about additional “meth needles.” (Id. at
4:30-5:24). He told Mr. Becklund he was under arrest. (Id. at 5:34-36.) Officer Johnson
ultimately found drugs in Mr. Becklund’s jacket. (See Conf. Exs., p.15; see also Tr., p.37 (p.105,
Ls.5-12.) Officer Johnson did not advise Mr. Johnson of his Miranda rights at any point. (See
Plaintiff’s Ex. 1; see also Tr., p.27 (p.68, Ls.7-19.))
The State charged Mr. Becklund by Information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., pp.24-25.) The State subsequently filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. Becklund was a
persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.30-31.) Mr. Becklund
filed a motion to suppress, arguing suppression was warranted because (1) he was seized without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) he was not advised of his Miranda rights.
(R., pp.32-47.) The State filed a brief in opposition. (R., pp.34-47.) The district court held a
hearing on the motion. (See Tr., pp.12-37.) Following the hearing, the district court issued a
memorandum decision and order denying Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.60-79.)
The district court concluded Officer Johnson had reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal activity when he detained Mr. Becklund. (R., p.71.) The district court explained its
reasoning as follows:
In this case, Ofﬁcer Johnson was able to reasonably articulate exactly why he
believed he had witnessed the Defendant William Becklund engage in an illicit
drug transaction with Martinez. Ofﬁcer Johnson had patrolled this neighborhood
on his bicycle for approximately 15 years. He had an intimate understanding of
the neighborhood and its high incidence of illicit drug use. His familiarity with the
high incidence of criminal drug activity in the neighborhood was bolstered by
statistical reports and brieﬁngs provided to him by his employer, the Boise Police
Department. Ofﬁcer Johnson, a 20-year law enforcement veteran had witnessed
hand to hand illicit drug transactions on several occasions and was familiar with
how such exchanges occur. Ofﬁcer Johnson also had personal knowledge of
reputed drug activity by Mr. Martinez. When Ofﬁcer Johnson ﬁrst observed the
Defendant and Mr. Martinez, he noticed that they were standing very close
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together in a tighter or guarded orientation with their hands held higher than is
normal for persons engaged in casual conversation. He observed these two
persons make what he described as furtive movements. The Defendant was
holding what appeared to be a clear or white case, possibly a sunglass case that
was an item of interest for Ofﬁcer Johnson regarding the suspected drug
transaction. Among the crowd, these two individual’s positioning and activity
stood out. He recognized their physical positioning as abnormal for casual
conversation. Ofﬁcer Johnson’s observation lead him to believe he was
witnessing a hand to hand illicit drug transaction between the Defendant and
Mr. Martinez. As Ofﬁcer Johnson rode up on the parties, the Defendant walked
away at a quicker pace than a normal walking pace . . . . Ofﬁcer Johnson’s
suspicion was further supported by Defendant’s act of dumping several syringes
out of a bag almost immediately after Ofﬁcer Johnson confronted him.
(R., pp.70-71.)
The district court also concluded there was no Miranda violation because Mr. Becklund
was not subjected to a custodial interrogation prior to being handcuffed. (R., p.75.) The district
court explained its reasoning as follows:
While the discussion included some investigative or probing questions by the
Ofﬁcer, the Defendant sat unrestrained on the ground in a public location during
daylight. He appeared to feel free to provide whatever responses or statements he
subjectively felt explained the circumstances. He did not appear to be forced or
coerced into responding to any of the questions. This was a rather rambling
dialogue that occurred concurrent with the ofﬁcer securing the scene and the
evidence that had been dumped on the ground by Defendant. During the
conversation the Ofﬁcer asked the Defendant for his identiﬁcation; inquired about
what the Ofﬁcer had observed; and inquired about whether the Defendant
possessed any other syringes or drugs.
(R., pp.76-77.)
Following the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Becklund pled guilty
to possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his
motion. (R., pp.80-92.) The district court accepted Mr. Becklund’s guilty plea, and sentenced
him to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed, and then suspended the sentence.
(Tr., p.128, Ls.11-25.) The judgment of conviction was entered on July 14, 2020, and
Mr. Becklund filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.98-106.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Becklund’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress for two reasons.

First, suppression of the physical evidence is necessary because Officer Johnson violated
Mr. Becklund’s rights under the Fourth Amendment by detaining him absent reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Second, suppression of the statements Mr. Becklund made prior to
being arrested is necessary under the Fifth Amendment because he was subjected to a custodial
interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. For either or both of these reasons,
this Court should reverse the denial of Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress using

a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 750 (2020). “This Court will
accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of
constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

C.

Suppression Of The Physical Evidence Is Warranted Under The Fourth Amendment
Because Officer Johnson Detained Mr. Becklund Absent Reasonable Suspicion Of
Criminal Activity
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. While a seizure must generally be based on probable cause
in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, an officer may detain an individual for a limited
investigatory detention if he has reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual has
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committed, or is about to commit, a crime. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). “Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of
the stop.” State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 673 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Not every suspicious or abnormal behavior is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.” Id.
(citation omitted). “The officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Officer Johnson testified that he suspected Mr. Becklund and Mr. Martinez were involved
in a “hand-to-hand drug deal” because they were “standing in close proximity . . . with their
hands raised.” (Tr., p.15 (p.19, L.20 – p.20, L.4.)) He testified he observed “furtive movement,”
but did not describe the nature of the furtive movement. (See id.) He explained, “[T]hey appeared
to have hands up, closer together, just a little bit tighter body language, a little bit more guarded,
standing very close together.” (Tr., p.16 (p.21, Ls.8-12.)) And he observed what looked like a
sunglasses case in Mr. Becklund’s hand. (R., p.62; Tr., p.16 (p.21, Ls.13-17.))
The district court concluded Officer Johnson had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity because he “was able to reasonably articulate exactly why he believed he had witnessed
the Defendant William Becklund engage in an illicit drug transaction with [Mr.] Martinez.”
(R., p.70.) The district court placed great weight on Officer Johnson’s testimony that the
particular neighborhood in which he observed Mr. Becklund and Mr. Martinez was known to
have a “high incidence of illicit drug use.” (R., p.70.) The district court also emphasized the fact
that Officer Johnson “had personal knowledge of reputed drug activity by Mr. Martinez.”
(R., p.70.)
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Neither of these factors is significant in determining whether Officer Johnson had
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Becklund was involved in criminal activity. The Idaho Supreme
Court recognized in Gonzales that “[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion that the
person is committing a crime.” 165 Idaho at 673 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Similarly, an individual’s proximity to others suspected of or associated with criminal activity,
without more, is also insufficient.” Id. (citation omitted).
It is true, of course, that “innocent acts, when considered together, may be suspicious
enough to justify an investigative detention.” Gonzales, 165 Idaho at 673. What additional facts
can be considered in this case? The district court pointed to the following:
(1) Mr. Becklund and Mr. Martinez were “standing in close proximity with their
hands raised” and were engaged in some unspecified “furtive movement.”
(2) Mr. Becklund was carrying what looked like a sunglasses case.
(3) As Officer Johnson rode his bicycle towards Mr. Becklund and Mr. Martinez,
Mr. Becklund “walked away at a quicker pace than a normal walking pace.”
(4) Mr. Becklund dumped several syringes out of a pouch after Officer Johnson
said something to him.
(Tr., p.15 (p.19, L.20 – p.20, L.4), p.16 (p.21, Ls.13-17); R., pp.62, 70-71.) None of these
factors, even when viewed together, provided Officer Johnson with reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.
First, there is nothing suspicious about the manner in which Mr. Becklund and
Mr. Martinez were standing. The fact that they were close together with their hands raised cannot
even support “a hunch” of criminal activity. The officer’s testimony that they were engaged in
some unspecified “furtive movement” should be discounted, as it is contrary to his testimony that
they were just standing together with their hands raised. Furtive movements can, of course,
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factor into a reasonable suspicion analysis, but Officer Johnson did not actually testify to any
furtive movements on the part of Mr. Becklund and Mr. Martinez. See State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (noting the officer did not articulate any furtive movements or behavior);
see and compare United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (officer
encountering two individuals in known troubled area justified in frisking individual where,
during frisk of defendant’s cohort, defendant moved behind officer, adjusted his jacket, and
inserted his hand into his jacket pocket).
Second, the fact that Mr. Becklund was carrying what looked like a sunglasses case,
along with numerous other items, see infra n.2, is of little significance. Officer Johnson did not
testify that he observed Mr. Becklund open or close the case, and did not articulate why the case
itself was significant.
Third, the fact that Mr. Becklund “walked away at a quicker than normal walking pace”
when approached by Officer Johnson on his bicycle should not weigh into the analysis. As an
initial matter, the district court’s finding in this regard is contradicted by the video evidence,
which does not show Mr. Becklund walking away at a fast pace. (See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 at 00:0308.) Moreover, even if he was walking away quickly, the fact that Mr. Becklund was hoping not
to speak to law enforcement cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion. See Gonzales, 165
Idaho at 674 (stating the driver’s decision not to speak with the officer cannot be considered
when evaluating whether there was reasonable suspicion to detain the passenger because the
driver had every right to refuse to speak with the officer); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at
498 (stating a person “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish these
grounds.”).
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Fourth, while it may seem suspicious that Mr. Becklund dumped several syringes on the
ground when confronted by Officer Johnson, we cannot draw much significance from this act as
we do not know what precipitated it. Officer Johnson could not recall when he said to
Mr. Becklund right before he dumped the pouch out, Tr., p.17 (p.26, Ls.4-8), and the video
recording of this part of the encounter does not include audio. (See Plaintiff’s Ex. at 00:15-25.) It
appears that Mr. Becklund dumped the pouch out upon request. See id. If so, his act of dumping
the pouch out was hardly suspicious.
The mere fact that Officer Johnson articulated the basis for his suspicion, as the district
court found, does not make that suspicion reasonable. Officer Johnson had a hunch that
Mr. Becklund was engaged in criminal activity, based largely on his presence near a homeless
shelter, with a person the officer suspected of being involved in drug activity. These factors
cannot support reasonable suspicion for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and the other
factors relied on by the district court are insignificant. The district court should have concluded
Officer Johnson detained Mr. Becklund absent reasonable suspicion, and should have granted
Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress.

D.

Suppression Of The Statements Mr. Becklund Made Prior To His Arrest Is Warranted
Under The Fifth Amendment Because He Was Subjected To A Custodial Interrogation
Without Being Advised Of His Miranda Rights
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held a person must be informed

of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to being subjected to
custodial interrogation; otherwise, any incriminating statements made by the person are
inadmissible at trial. 384 U.S. at 444-45; see also State v. Henson, 138 Idaho 791, 795 (2003)
(discussing Miranda). “As a practical matter, Miranda and its progeny establish that Miranda
warnings are required where a suspect is in custody.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404
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(2016) citation omitted). Whether a suspect is in custody is determined by “whether there is a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The test to determine whether a defendant is in
custody is objective.” Id. at 405. “The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that “[d]etermining whether an
individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed . . . is . . . the first step in the analysis, not the
last.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). Mr. Becklund easily satisfies this first step, as
his freedom of movement was curtailed by Officer Johnson, who testified that Mr. Becklund was
not free to leave after being detained. (Tr., p.20 (p.37, L.19 – p.38, L.3.)) In light of the officer’s
testimony, it would be unreasonable for Mr. Becklund to believe he was at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.
The next question in the custody analysis is “whether the relevant environment presents
the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in
Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 599. In answering this question, the Idaho Supreme Court has
considered “where the questioning occurred, the duration of the interrogation, whether the
defendant is informed that the detention may not be temporary, and the intensiveness of the
questions and requests of the police officer.” State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 313, 429 P.3d
850, 854 (2018) (citation omitted). The district court concluded these factors did not support a
finding that Mr. Becklund was in custody. The district court erred.
The district court explained:
While the discussion included some investigative or probing questions by the
Ofﬁcer, the Defendant sat unrestrained on the ground in a public location during
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daylight. He appeared to feel free to provide whatever responses or statements he
subjectively felt explained the circumstances. He did not appear to be forced or
coerced into responding to any of the questions.
(R., pp.76-77.) The fact that Mr. Becklund was not restrained, and was interrogated in public,
does not mean the questioning was not coercive. To “coerce” means “[t]o compel by force or
threat.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Here, Officer Johnson compelled
Mr. Becklund’s incriminating statements by refusing to accept his repeated denials of possessing
illegal drugs.
The interrogation began when Officer Johnson twice asked Mr. Becklund to sit down.
(See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 at 00:30-36.) While the officer’s tone was not threatening, his questioning
was intense. He asked Mr. Becklund over and over again about methamphetamine:
·

He first asked, referring to the sunglasses case Mr. Becklund was holding,
“How much do you got in there?” (Id. at 00:54-55.)

·

Less than a minute later, he again asked, referring to the same case, “How
much you got in here?” (Id. at 1:48-52.)

·

And just ten seconds later, “How much meth have you got in here?” (Id. at
1:58-59.)

While the questioning was not prolonged, this actually weighs in favor of this being a custodial
interrogation, as it was clear Officer Johnson would not accept Mr. Becklund’s denials. Even
after Mr. Becklund agreed to allow Officer Johnson to search his glasses case, Id. at 2:03-06,
Officer Johnson did not stop his questioning. After searching the glasses case, Officer Johnson
again asked Mr. Becklund, “Do you have any more methamphetamine on you?” (Id. at 3:30-32.)
Mr. Becklund answered, “No,” and the officer asked him again, “Are you certain of that?” (Id. at
3:33-37.)
Throughout the questioning, Mr. Becklund was seated on the ground, with his back up
against a fence, and two police officers, with their bikes nearby, were standing above him. (See
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Plaintiff’s Ex. 1 at 3:58-4:03.) A reasonable person in Mr. Becklund’s position would have felt
he was in custody, as he was not free to leave, and was subjected to coercive questioning, that
was going to end, one way or another, in his arrest. The district court should have granted
Mr. Becklund’s motion to suppress the statements he made prior to his arrest, as they were
obtained during a custodial interrogation, conducted without Miranda warnings.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Becklund respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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